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 Abstract:  Nuclear reactors entail massive non-transferrable site-specific 
investments.  The resulting appropriable quasi-rents offer the mob the ideal target.  In 
exchange for large fees, it can either promise to "protect" the utility (and silence the 
reactor's local opponents) or "extort" from it (and desist from inciting local opponents).  
Using municipality-level (1742 cities, towns, villages) and prefecture-level (47) Japanese 
panel data covering the years from 1980 to 2010, I find exactly this phenomenon:  when a 
utility announces plans to build a reactor, the level of extortion climbs.   
 Reactors have broad-ranging effects on social capital as well.  In general, the 
perceived health costs to nuclear power are highest for young families.  As a result,  if a 
utility announces plans for a new reactor, these families disappear. Yet these are the men 
and women who invest most heavily in the social capital that keeps communities intact.  
When they disappear, reliance on government subsidies increases, and divorce rates rise.  
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 The journalist had landed a job on the Fukushima cleanup crew (Suzuki, 2011: 9-
10).  As he chatted with the other workers, one of them explained his financial 
connection:   
 There's nothing special here.  A huge public project comes to a tiny town.  
That's really all there is to it.  Dams and highways are exactly the same.  It's just 
that this one involves a nuclear power plant, and that's something no one 
understands.   
 [The local politicians] represent the town, and negotiate with the power 
company.  They cut the deal with a general contractor.  They spread the work to 
the locals.   
 But that would never get them enough workers.   
 So they talk to my friends in the other cities.  They recruit companies with 
sympathetic bosses.  Without us -- without the mob -- the work just would never 
get done.  It'd never even get started.  ... 
 Information about this kind of work comes straight to our place.  We're the 
ones who assemble the votes for the elections.  You could call it returning a favor, 
but it's just a case of relying on supporters to survive.   ...  Take the town council 
around here.  Anyone we support will get elected. 
The man switched tacks, and offered the journalist a suggestion: 
 You -- you're short of money, right?  Why don't you move here?  You 
could work a few years at our construction firm, and then run for office. 
 The mob (known colloquially as the "yakuza") had made enormous profits 
building nuclear plants, the informant insisted.  But it did not just build the plants.  It also 
smoothed the approval process (Suzuki, 2011: 24):  
 Why did we make so much money when a nuclear plant came to town?  
It's obvious.  We made money because we could make anyone who threatened to 
complain shut up. 
 In the article that follows, I trace some of these connections between nuclear 
power and the mob.  In Japan as elsewhere, firms in the organized-crime industry invest 
in the personnel, skills, and technology needed to deliver violence.  With it, they advance 
and protect their activities in illegal sectors.  By simple economies of scope, however, 
sometimes they can exploit the same investments to other ends.  Relevant here, they can 
use their investment in violence to extort funds from firms that compete in legal markets.  
If a developer invests heavily in preparation for a large and disruptive construction 
project, they can extort funds by manipulating (or threatening to manipulate) local 
opposition.     
 I also trace the connections between nuclear power and social cohesion.  A 
nuclear reactor can devastate a community's social capital.  Radiation risks are health 
risks, and the cost to those risks falls with age: rectors impose the highest perceived harm 
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on young families. 1
 To explore the connections between nuclear power, the mob, and levels of social 
capital, I construct two panel datasets.  Some of the data are available at the level of the 
47 prefectures, and some at the level of 1742 municipalities.  I cover the years 1980 to 
2010.  I then study the relationship between the planning, construction, and operation of 
the nuclear plants, and crime rates, demographic characteristics, and proxies for local 
social capital. 
  As a result, intact young couples do not move to communities 
building a reactor (especially with mob labor).  They stay away.  Yet these are the men 
and women who invest most heavily in the social ties that hold communities together.  As 
they disappear, social capital disintegrates.  Potential employers stay away.  Jobs vanish, 
couples divorce, and people rely on government transfer payments.   
 The results are straightforward.  When a power company announces a new 
reactor, the mob arrives and levels of extortion climb.  Once the company clears 
regulatory hurdles and begins construction, that extortion stops.  Simultaneously, 
however, young families begin to disappear.  Social capital starts to crumble.  
Unemployment rises, transfer payments increase, and divorce rates climb.   
 I first survey the literature on organized crime generally (Sec. I.A., B.) and in 
Japan specifically (Sec. I.C.).  I examine the peculiar ties among organized crime, the 
nuclear power industry, and social capital (Sec. II).  Finally, I turn to the empirical results 
(Sec. III). 
 
I.  Organized Crime 
A.  The Genesis of the Mob: 
 1.  Introduction. -- Firms in the mob everywhere extort money from rivals in the 
legal sector.  They do so because -- largely for other reasons -- they invest heavily in the 
personnel, skills, and technology necessary to deliver violence.  With that investment 
sunk, they exploit economies of scope and use the violence to extort.   
 On why mob firms invest in violence, scholars propose two explanations.  Some 
suggest that they grew by selling property-rights protection in societies where the state 
protected those rights only weakly.  Others suggest that they grew by selling goods and 
services in illegal sectors and invested in the violence necessary to protect these other 
investments.  Given that the state does not protect property rights in sectors it defines as 
illegal, the two theories overlap.  They also may just describe historical trajectories in 
different societies.  The Sicilian mafia dates from a time when the Italian state lacked the 
power to protect property rights on the island.  The American mob grew by selling 
alcohol during Prohibition.   
 Consider each explanation in turn. 
 
 2.  Where the state is weak. -- The Sicilian mafia "produces, promotes, and sells 
private protection," writes Diego Gambetta (1993: 1).  It protects property and enforces 
contracts for a fee.  In the words of Stergios Skaperdas (2001: 174; see Kumar & 
Skaperdas, 2008; Anderson, 1995), it holds protection as its "defining economic activity."  
Historically, it began in the market for protection and expanded into other industries over                                                         
1 Whether reactors actually present these cancer risks from low-level radiation is not the issue here 
(see note 8, infra).  What matters is that many Japanese believe they do. 
Nuclear Power and the Mob:  Page  4 
time.  Analytically, it invested in resources crucial to the protection industry and 
exploited economies of scope to expand into industries adjacent to it.   
 Mobs everywhere protect property rights and enforce contracts; what 
distinguishes Sicily is the way they so consistently supply this service across the market 
for a fee.  Elsewhere (as in the U.S., below), firms in illegal markets tend to build their 
own private enforcement capacity within their firm.  In Sicily, the mob sells that 
protection to other firms.  Its customers buy and sell goods and services on their own, but 
hire the mob to enforce the contractual terms they negotiate.   
 To deliver the service it sells, the Sicilian mafia uses violence.  As Gambetta 
(1993: 2) put it, the firms use violence as "a means, not an end; a resource, not the final 
product."  Contracting parties buy protection, and the mafia firms use their capacity for 
violence to provide that protection.  The contracting parties buy the protection because 
they cannot trust their partners to perform voluntarily, and cannot trust the state to force 
them to perform involuntarily.  Given that neither contracting partner trusts the other, 
"protection becomes desirable" (Gambetta, 1993: 2).   
 The economies of scale follow from the nature of violence itself.  To enforce a 
contract effectively, a mob firm must be able to out-muscle the other party to its client's 
contract.  It must be able to out-muscle any rival firm that the other party might hire for 
its own protection.  And it must be able to hold the state at bay.  Toward these ends, it 
will need a large capacity for violence.  Only then will it earn a return on its investment. 
 For reasons peculiar to the transition from a feudal to openly competitive 
economy in western Sicily, the late 19th century Italian government failed to extend its 
control into the area.  Residents took title to land, but could not trust the government to 
protect their lots.  They developed businesses, but could not trust it to enforce their 
claims.  Into that vacuum, men with a comparative advantage in violence sold protective 
services.2
 The demand for protection in a world of weak state power explains the rise of the 
mob in several other societies too (see Sung, 2004, for a comparative study).  The 
Chinese triads, for instance, thrived during the decades of war.  When foreign countries 
began to dismember China during the last half of the 19th century, the Manchu dynasty 
disintegrated.  As it did, power moved to a shifting constellation of Nationalists, 
Communists, warlords, and the Japanese army.  Within the resulting vacuum, the triads 
amassed their often brutal power (Wakeman, 1996).   
   
 The Russian mob similarly grew in the post-Soviet vacuum of state control.  
Entrepreneurs in the new environment needed a way to protect their property and enforce 
their contracts.  Some had obtained their assets "from illegal shadow dealings in the 
Soviet era" and "were naturally unwilling to have any relations with the state police"  
(Volkov, 1999: 742).  Even those without that dubious ancestry, though, found the new 
                                                        
2 Gambetta (1993: ch. 4).  See also, e.g., Arlacchi (1986: 26); Konrad & Skaperdas (2012); Hess, 
1996: 16); Andvig & Fjeldstad (2001); Catanzaro (1992: x, 19); Anderson (1995).  Some scholars (e.g., 
Gambetta, 1993: 77; Verese, 1994) have added that the mafia emerged not just because of a low level of 
state power, but because of the low level of trust among private residents.  Trust is unusually low in 
southern Italy, they write.  The mafia developed in response to that distrust.  Of course, the level of local 
trust is obviously endogenous to what a mob chooses to do.  Trust may be low in Sicily, but -- as Gambetta 
himself notes -- it is low in part because the mafia works to keep it that way.   
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state hard to trust (Varese, 1994).  Rather than rely on it, they hired enforcement services 
privately.  Writes Vadim Volkov (1999: 746; see Skaperdas, 2001, 179): 
Before signing formal business contracts, companies acquire information about 
each other's enforcement partners ("whom do you work with?") and arrange a 
meeting between enforcement partners (strelka)." 
 
 3. Where the market is illicit. -- The American "mafia" traces its origins to 
different historical patterns.  The U.S. is not Sicily.  The state is not weak, but even a 
strong state will not enforce property rights to transactions it declares illegal.  When it 
bans a set of contracts, some participants to those transactions will turn to private 
protection services.  As Gambetta (1993: 3) put it, "every time the state decrees a 
particular transaction or commodity illegal, a potential market for private protection is 
created."  Hence the contrast:  the Sicilian mafia arose in a world where the state did not 
enforce any property rights, legal or illegal; the U.S. mob developed within the illegal 
sectors of a world with a strong state.3
 Effective 1920, American voters amended the Constitution to ban the sale of 
alcohol.  Finding their drinks illegal, consumers turned to smuggled foreign liquor and 
domestic moonshine.  Whether legal or illegal, alcohol will pass through several firms 
before reaching the consumer.  The distiller will buy supplies.  He will consign his 
product with a trucker who will deliver it to a wholesaler.  The wholesaler will entrust it 
to another trucker who will transport it to a retailer.  And the retailer will sell it to the 
consumer.  Some parties will skip a step or two:  a distiller may integrate vertically into 
shipping; a bar may buy directly from wholesaler.  Other parties will add a few extra 
steps. 
   
 Because the U.S. government had declared the underlying product illegal, the 
participating firms needed a private capacity for violence.  At each transactional node, 
they negotiated a contract.  Yet virtually all these contracts were ones the state would not 
enforce.  If a trucker stole the liquor, the consigning distiller could not call the police.  If 
a distiller refused to pay for the transportation, the trucker could not sue.  As a result, 
firms in the industry needed a private police force strong enough both to forestall state 
intervention, and to enforce private property and contractual rights.   
 Some of the best-known members of the American mob did come to prominence 
in Sicilian fashion by selling bootleggers protection by contract.  Take Meyer Lansky and 
Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel.  The two first met as teenagers on the lower East Side of New 
York.  They began in the gambling industry, but soon moved into contract enforcement in 
the alcohol distribution network.  Together, they enforced the terms of their clients' 
transactions, and stole cargo from their clients' rivals.  They bought equipment; they hired 
men willing to use it to maim and kill; they organized those men into teams; and they                                                         
3 The Sicilian-U.S. contrast extends to a subsidiary question as well.  The Sicilian mafia sold 
enforcement services to independent firms across the market.  In the U.S., many of the early organized 
crime syndicates expanded by vertical integration from the market for the original illegal goods into that 
enforcement services industry.  In other words, the Sicilian-U.S. contrast does not just concern the 
historical origins of the mob.  It also concerns a question basic to industrial organization more generally:  
whether to buy or build -- whether to buy protection (as a requisite input to production) on the open market 
(as in Sicily), or to produce it within the firm (as in the U.S.) (see Dyck (1995), Garoupa (1999), and 
Fiorentini & Peltzman (1995) for some of the transactions-cost considerations involved). 
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bribed state agents (Messick, 1971: 23-31; Montague, 2005: 30-55).  They then marketed 
their services to firms in the alcohol industry.  Eventually -- but only several years later -- 
they expanded into their own narcotics and large-scale gambling operations (Lacey, 
1991: chs. 5-6; Messick, 1971: ch. 5).   
 Other firms in the American mob developed backwards.  Lansky and Segal began 
as a specialty contract enforcement firm but expanded into other illegal services and 
products.  Other firms began in illegal services and products, and expanded internally 
into private contract and property enforcement.  Arnold Rothstein, for instance, started in 
the illegal service sector and developed his own private capacity for violence to protect 
his investments.  Born in 1882, Rothstein was 31 when Prohibition began.  He had 
already established a thriving gambling empire in New York, from floating craps games, 
to horse tracks and casinos.  By 1919, he would famously fix the World Series (Pietrusza, 
2003: chs. 3, 8, 11-12; Clarke, 1929: chs. 2-3).   
 As of 1920, Rothstein had become the central figure in the New York mob, what 
one historian would call "the J.P. Morgan of the underworld."4
 Alphonse "Scarface Al" Capone similarly developed a capacity for violence to 
protect his investments in illegal service industries.  For Capone, those illegal sectors had 
involved (here too) gambling, but also prostitution (Bergreen, 1994: ch. 2; Pasley, 1931: 
Pt. 1).  There, he had acquired a reputation for an impulsive brutality extreme even by the 
standards of the Prohibition-era underworld.  Exploiting the economies of scope to 
violence, from these early investments in gambling and prostitution he expanded into 
alcohol (Bergreen, 1994: ch. 3; Pasley, 1931: Pt. 7).  
  To protect his gambling 
investments, he had grown within his own firms a capacity for violence.  From this base 
in gaming, he expanded into alcohol and, eventually, narcotics (May, 2009: ch. 8).  He 
did so (again) to exploit economies of scope.  To enforce property rights in gambling, he 
had invested both (a) in the equipment, personnel, and organization necessary to supply 
violence, and (b) in the bribery necessary to corrupt city and state officials.  Now, he 
could exploit those investments to expand into alcohol and narcotics.   
 Modern inner-city gangs operate by much the same economic principles, albeit at 
a less sophisticated level.  For the most part, they specialize in the retail narcotics market.  
To enforce contract and property rights, they invest in reputations for violence.  To date, 
they only lightly diversify into other industries.  When Steven Levitt and Sudhir 
Venkatech (2000) explored the finances of a major Chicago gang, they found both that 
the gang competed in few peripheral markets, and that it did not bribe city and state 
officials.  It earned only trivial revenue from unrelated protection services, and apparently 
spent nothing on corrupting local police and politicians.   
 
B.  Extortion: 
 From their roots in either protection or other illegal markets, many mob firms 
diversify into extortion.  Against private firms in the legal sector, they threaten violence 
and extract large amounts of wealth.  The technology of violence being what it is, mobs 
that offer protection can easily expand into extortion.  To supply protection, a mob firm 
will need equipment.  It will buy guns and knives, and sometimes bombs.  And it will                                                         
4  Jewish Virtual Library, "Arnold Rothstein." Available at:  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Rothstein.html.   
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need personnel.  It will hire young men willing and able to use its guns, knives, and 
bombs.   
 Once it invests in this equipment and personnel, a firm can use them as effectively 
to extort as to protect (e.g., Konrad & Skaperdas, 2006, 2012; Skaperdas, 2001; 
Skarbeck, 2012).  Economies of scope, in other words, transfer directly between the two 
activities.  A well-equipped mob can use its equipment and personnel plausibly to 
promise to protect its clients from those who would harm them.  It can use exactly the 
same equipment and personnel plausibly to extort pay-offs from non-clients in exchange 
for its agreeing not to harm them itself.   
 In most societies, the mob does indeed extort.  Gambetta (1993) placed protection 
at the heart of the mob, but identified extortion as another activity in which it routinely 
engaged.  Thomas Schelling (1967, 1971) placed extortion at its heart, and identified 
protection as another activity in which it routinely engaged:  "the business of organized 
crime," declared he (1971: 647), "is extortion."  No doubt it is a crucial distinction for 
some purposes; it is not one that matters here.5
 
 
C.  The Japanese Mob: 
 1.  Genesis. -- The mob in Japan reached its current power through a path similar 
to that in the U.S.  This was not the Sicilian path.  The state in Japan is not weak -- it is 
not weak now, and was not weak in the early post-war years. 6
 Initially, Japanese voters complied.  They elected a Socialist prime minister in 
1947, and let him implement the elaborate controls he wanted.  The ensuing disasters 
followed textbook economics.  Facing pervasive price controls, firms did not invest.  
They did not expand.  They did not even sell.  Instead, sellers hoarded.  Massive 
shortages ensued, and sales shifted to the inevitable black market.  On that illegal market 
the mob obtained its first stronghold (Hessler, 2012). 
  As under the U.S. 
Prohibition, the mob in Japan began in the illegal sector.  Before the war, it had limited 
itself mostly to gambling.  During the early post-war years, however, government 
bureaucrats intervened heavily in the economy.  They had intervened rigidly during the 
war, and they did the same after its end.  With their own New Deal bias, American 
occupation officials blithely encouraged them along (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2005).  
 From this start, the mob moved quickly into methamphetamines.  In the chaos of 
the early post-war years addiction ran rampant.  The military had issued 
methamphetamines to its soldiers to induce them to fight.  It had issued them to                                                         5 In most societies, the mob operates not just in illegal industries, but in several legal sectors as 
well -- and most commonly in sectors like construction that use low-skilled male labor and that turn on 
government contacts.  To recruit workers, the mob can exploit its ties to the population from which it 
recruits its own members.  To obtain government-related projects, it can exploit its investments (made to 
facilitate its illegal activities) in corrupting public officials.  Fiorentini & Peltzman (1995: 22) stress the 
mob's frequent "control over key input markets such as the labour market" in a variety of societies.  
Arlacchi (1986: 62-67, 96), Anderson (1995: 43), and Gambetta & Reuter (1995: 122) discuss the mafia's 
ties to the construction industry in Sicily.  Others show how the mob uses its control over American unions 
to manipulate the labor market more broadly (Skaperdas, 2001: 176; Gambetta & Reuter, 1995).  Fiorentini 
& Peltzman (1995: 22) refer to the mob's ability to "manipulate the public procurement mechanism."  And 
as Suzuki's (2011) account at the start of this article shows, the mob brokers labor services to construction 
projects in Japan as well. 
6 Harasyiw (2003) to the contrary notwithstanding. 
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employees in support industries to induce them to work.  When the war ended, the 
remaining stock shifted quickly onto the black market (Suwaki, Fukui & Konuma, 1997: 
201; Wada, 2011: 63). 
 Amid the pandemonium, methamphetamine abuse soared.  At first, consumers 
took it in tablet form.  Soon, they injected it intravenously.  By 1954, abusers numbered 
550,000, and increasingly committed high profile crimes.  Methamphetamine usage fell 
in the mid-1950s, but heroin abuse took its place and continued into the 1960s (Suwaki, 
Fukui & Konuma, 1997: 201-02; Wada, 2011: 63).   
 As with alcohol during Prohibition, consumers obtained their methamphetamine 
and heroin through an elaborate contractual chain:  firms manufactured or imported the 
drug and sold it to wholesalers; the wholesalers shipped it and distributed it to retailers; 
the retailers offered and sold it to consumers.  At every step, a contracting partner could 
default, renege, or cheat.  At every step, rival market players could steal or disrupt. 
 The mob emerged by dominating this industry.  Vertically integrated as in the 
U.S., mob firms in Japan manufacture, refine, ship, distribute, sell -- and enforce 
contractual terms through violence.  Sicilian mafia firms sold enforcement (protection) to 
private parties on the market.  Japanese mob firms produced enforcement services 
internally to protect their own contracts. 
 
 2.  Current status. -- (a) Numbers.  Police put the Japanese mob membership at 
25,600.  Under Japanese law, prefectural public safety commissions can and do designate 
the principal firms as organized crime firms.  This results in the (perhaps misleadingly) 
precise talleys of group memberships.7
 [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
  Add unreported affiliates and hangers-on and the 
25,600 number doubles, and perhaps grows even more (Keisatsu cho, Hanzai hakusho, 
2014, tab. 4-3-1-1).  Of those members, half work for one of the three largest firms.  
Indeed, over 40 percent work for the largest of them all, the infamous Yamaguchi gumi 
(Table 1, Panel A). 
 These men are indeed the people Americans envision when they think of the 
"yakuza."  In this case, the bizarre stereotypes are actually true.  Many of the men do 
sport flamboyant full-body tattoos -- the practice may explain why so few other Japanese 
wear any tattoos at all.  They may be missing a finger joint or two -- amputation is still 
the way to apologize for botching an assignment.  They dress in loud suits, wear 
sunglasses indoors, and (if they can afford it) drive foreign cars.   
 Mob firms apparently earn the largest share of their revenues from 
methamphetamines.  According to a now-dated 1989 police survey (Keisatsu cho, 1989: 
tab. 1-9), they earned 34.8 percent of their money from stimulants, and another 16.9 
percent from gambling.  They earned 8.7 percent from protection fees, and smaller 
amounts from prostitution.  From legal sectors, they generated 19.7 percent. 
 Mob affiliates also find themselves arrested most often for crimes tied to this 
methamphetamine market.  Police enforce the methamphetamine ban aggressively. A 
hapless American who arrives with prescription Adderall can find himself surrounded by 
the airport police.  In 2013, police arrested 6,045 mob affiliates on methamphetamine-                                                        
7 Boryokudan in ni yoru futo na koi no boshito ni kansuru horitsu [Act Concerning the Prevension 
of Improper Conduct Organized Crime Members], Law No. 77 of 1991. 
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related charges.  They also arrested 2,807 for battery, 2,470 for theft, 2,321 for fraud, and 
1,084 for extortion (Table 1, Pan. B). 
 Mob affiliates dominate the arrests for some crimes.  Police may arrest 2,470 
affiliates for theft, but the affiliates do not dominate theft arrests.  After all, police arrest 
huge numbers of people for theft who have no ties to the mob.  But of the people they 
arrest on amphetamine-related charges, a majority comes from the mob.  A majority of 
those they arrest for gambling-related charges comes from the mob.  And a large fraction 
(though not majority) of those they arrest for blackmail and extortion has ties to the mob 
as well (Table 2, Sec. A). 
 [Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 As a result, for certain crimes, arrest data signal mob location.  To be sure, police 
do not arrest everyone who commits a crime, and do not choose the criminals they arrest 
randomly.  If under political pressure to suppress the mob, they will focus their efforts on 
mob members.  If bribed to ignore the mob (though by all accounts police corruption is 
very low in Japan), they may focus on non-mob criminals.  But subject to those caveats, 
arrest data for some crimes will identify the cities and towns where the mob operates 
most intensively.  The point matters for this study, because the police release prefecture-
level crime data every year, but local mob membership only occasionally.  They did 
release that membership data for 2011.  In Table 2 Sec. B, I regress the number of crimes 
at the prefecture-level on mob membership and general population.  As mob membership 
is obviously endogenous, consider these results a simple measure of correlation.  As 
expected, the numbers of extortion, methamphetamine, and sex crimes in a prefecture 
correlate strongly with the number of mob members.  The number of thefts does not. 
 
 (b) Membership.  Most members of the Japanese mob are young, unskilled men 
who never took to schooling.  According to the 1989 police white paper (Keisatsu cho, 
1989), over 80 percent of mob members did not finish high school -- this in a country 
with a graduation rate over 95 percent.  Of the members surveyed, 17 percent held 
regular jobs, 25.9 percent had irregular jobs, and 52.3 percent held no jobs at all. 
 Most mob members come either from the long-time underclass known as the 
burakumin (see Upham, 1987: ch. 3) or from the Korean resident alien community.  In 
1986, one pair of U.S. journalists cited the police for an estimate that 70 percent of the 
Yamaguchi gumi came from the underclass, and 10 percent from among the Koreans 
(Kaplan & Dubro, 1986: 145; see also Kinsgston, 2013: 244).  Twenty years later, a 
former official from the Public Security Intelligence Agency reported that 60 percent of 
the mob came from the underclass, and 30 percent from the Korean community.8
 The Japanese mob supplies some services that unwind dysfunctional government 
policy.  Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West (2000) nicely identify several.  Where tenant 
protection law stops developers from evicting tenants, for instance, the mob helps them 
  For 
years, observers studiously avoided mentioning the tie between the mob and the 
underclass.  Increasingly, however, as police arrest prominent underclass leaders 
(including leaders of the famed Burakumin Liberation League), they disclose that the 
men concurrently held high-level posts in the mob (Mori, 2009).  The ties between the 
two groups are simply too dense any longer to ignore. 
                                                        
8 Lecture by Mitsuhiro Suganuma, available at:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNAJVnjlR2g 
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skirt those legal restrictions.  Where the bankruptcy regime introduces inefficiencies, the 
mob streamlines the process.  That it sometimes remedies bad policy, however, should 
not distract from the essentially predatory nature of most of what it does.  
 
II.  Nuclear Power, the Mob, and Social Capital 
A.  Introduction: 
 This article turns on two propositions.   
 (A) The mob will extort funds most aggressively where firms make heavy 
site-specific, non-transferrable investments, and where the economic value of 
those investments can be expropriated through the political process.  Of such 
investments, nuclear reactors constitute the quintessential example.   
 (B) The perceived risks from nuclear reactors fall with age.  Those risks 
are primarily health risks, and involve conditions (particularly cancer) that appear 
only after many years. 9
I explain these propositions in this Section II.  I test them empirically in the following 
Section III. 
  Necessarily, they present relatively small costs for 
residents already at retirement age.  For young couples about to start a family, 
they pose much larger risks. 
 
B.  Nuclear Power and the Mob: 
 1.  Introduction. -- Nuclear plants-in-planning invite extortion and protection.  
They require the utility (heavily regulated but fundamentally a private corporation rather 
than government agency) to make massive site-specific investments:  surveys, political 
and regulatory goodwill, licenses, and ton after ton of reinforced concrete.  These 
investments entail huge costs.  They do not transfer.  And susceptible always to political 
nullification, they are regulatorily fragile.  Table 3 details the facilities involved. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 Take just the costs.  Of all reactors in Japan, the cheapest has been Kansai 
Electric's first reactor at Mihama.  Placed in service in 1970, it cost 31.2 billion yen.  The 
most expensive was the Monju fast breeder reactor, placed in service in 1991 for 588.6 
billion yen.  The mean cost of construction for all reactors was 247 billion yen.  The 
seven reactors at Tokyo Electric's massive Kashiwazaki complex on the Japan Sea cost a 
total of 2,576 billion yen (Denryoku, 2013). 
 At stake are the quasi-rents that these large site-specific investments necessarily 
create.  Given those quasi-rents, the mob can take two steps.  First, it can extort:  it can 
threaten to fan public opposition to levels that will block the planned construction.  
Second, it can protect:  it can offer to silence opponents who might otherwise threaten 
construction.   
 Rumors about extortion and protection have circulated for decades, but 
prominently hit the news post-Fukushima.  As Suzuki (2011) noted at the start of this 
article, the mob sold protection by offering to silence the utility's opponents.  The 
Yamaguchi-gumi and Sumiyoshi-kai allegedly extracted large sums from Tokyo Electric                                                         
9 It is not clear that neighbors to nuclear power plants do incur a cancer risk.  The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (obviously not a disinterested party) suggests not:  "Although radiation may cause 
cancer at high dose rates, public health data do not absolutely establish the occurrence of cancer following 
exposure ot low doses and dose rates ...."  (NRC, 2015). 
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by threatening to disclose safety problems.10  And according to one journalist, a Tokyo 
Electric subcontractor testified in court that "it was standard practice to pay off local 
yakuza groups and politicians to obtain construction projects, including those in the 
nuclear industry."11
 
   
 2.  Regulatory and political threats. -- If adamant enough, local residents can 
substantially hike the cost of a reactor and delay its operation, and potentially even kill it.  
Consider the delay from the time a utility announced its plans for a reactor, to the time it 
began operating it (see Table 3).  For the first 10 reactors, the delay averaged 5.5 years.  
Primarily because of the growing opposition, by the time of the last 10 reactors that delay 
had climbed to 8.1 years.   
 For decades, the Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry (METI; formerly MITI) 
licensed the reactors.12
 In order to convince residents to welcome a reactor, the national government 
offered lavish subsidies, jobs, and tax revenues (Aldrich, 2008: 119; Dusinberre & 
Aldrich, 2011).  Take a 2004 pamphlet METI published to generate support for new 
nuclear plants (Keizai, 2004).  From the initial environmental impact statement to 
operation ten years later, it promised a community subsidies (in addition to jobs) of 39.1 
billion yen.  Once a plant went operational, it promised subsidies and revenues over the 
next ten years of 50.2 billion.  To communities that agreed to accept nuclear waste sites, 
it promised even more. 
  After choosing a site, a utility produced an environmental impact 
statement and assembled technical plans.  It contacted METI, and the ministry consulted 
with the Nuclear Power Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission.  Once it 
obtained the necessary approvals, it started building.  When finished, it submitted to still 
more inspections.   
 Sometimes, militantly determined residents could kill a planned reactor.  
Obviously, they could protest and demonstrate.  Assorted violent Trotskyite groups stood 
always ready to help (Keisatsu sho, Keisatsu hakusho, 2013).  They (e.g., the 
Revolutionary Marxist Faction, or Kakumaru-ha) had their roots in the New Left student 
groups of the 1960s.  During the 1970s, they had fought the new airport at Narita.  More 
recently, they have turned to nuclear power.  Throughout, though, they brought to their 
efforts a level of anarchic violence rarely seen in Japan.   
 Residents could elect anti-nuclear candidates to local governments.  The national 
government might control the reactor license itself, but determined mayors, governors, 
and prefectural assemblies could stymie development in a nearly endless variety of ways.                                                          
10 Adelstein, Nov. 19, 2012 (Yamaguchi gumi payoff);  Adelstein, May 24, 2012 (Sumiyoshi kai 
payoff); Adelstein, Dec. 30, 2011. 
11 Adelstein, Dec. 30, 2011. 
12 See generally Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth (1995: 182-83); Genshiryoku (2003).  The 
process follows statutes relating to the electrical power industry generally and to the nuclear power industry 
specifically:  primarily, the Kaku genryo busshitsu, kaku nenryo busshitsu oyobi genshiryo no kisei ni 
kansuru horitsu [Law Regarding the Regulation of the Quality of Nuclear Raw Materials, Nuclear Fuel and 
Nuclear Reactors], Law No. 166 of 1957, Secs. 23, 24, 37, and the Denki jigyo ho [Electrical Business 
Act], Law No. 170 of 1964, Secs. 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 107, and the Kankyo eikyo hyoka ho [Environmental 
Impact Evaluation Act], Law No. 81 of 1997.  The process is still very much like the early 1990s process 
that Cohen, McCubbins & Rosenbluth (1995) described. 
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When Tokyo Electric built its Fukushima reactors, the governor held a veto (which he did 
not use) -- since the utility needed his permission to fill part of the local bay.13  When 
Tohoku Electric planned a reactor in Maki (Niigata prefecture), residents elected an anti-
nuclear mayor.  He promptly sold the site to an ally, and the ally refused to sell to the 
utility.14
 Residents could also call plebiscites (Kanbara, 1996).  Their votes often had no 
legally binding effect, but if strongly enough opposed the residents could -- and 
sometimes did -- halt a utility's plans.  They halted it, for example, when Tokyo Electric 
tried to use plutonium (far more dangerous than uranium) fuel in its Kashiwazaki plant.  
They held a plebiscite, and voted against allowing plutonium.  They had no legal right to 
tell Tokyo Electric what fuel to burn, but facing fierce opposition the firm canceled its 
plans anyway (Jijiro, 2002; see also Saito, 2011).   
  Tohoku Electric challenged the transfer in court, but the judge sided with the 
town and the utility had no choice but to abandon its plans. 
 
 3.  Litigation. -- And opponents could embroil utilities in nearly endless litigation.  
The point is not that the opponents won the cases -- they usually lost.  The point is not 
that the mob itself used the courts -- most plaintiffs seem to have brought left-leaning 
political loyalties.  The point instead is that the scale of litigation reflected the strength of 
the opposition.  That strength reflected the political vulnerability of the utilities.  And that 
vulnerability, in turn, created the opportunity for the mob to manipulate local opposition 
and "hold up" the utility.   
 Anti-nuclear opponents had been fighting the Fukushima reactors in court since 
the early 1970s.15  In 1975, 400 local residents challenged Tokyo Electric's Fukushima 
operating license.  They complained about earthquake risk, but the court declared that the 
regulators had properly weighed the risk and confirmed the license. 16
 Opponents also bought stock in Tokyo Electric and filed derivative suits.  When 
the cooling system in one of the Fukushima reactors malfunctioned in 1989, they sued to 
shutter it.  The court dismissed their claim for what amounted to the business judgment 
 
                                                        
13 The governor did not use the veto, so local opponents challenged the land-fill permit in court.  
Onoda v. Matsudaira, 894 Hanrei jiho 39 (Fukushima D. Ct. June 19, 1978). 
14  Takai v. Sasaguchi, 217 Hanrei chiho jiji 59 (Niigata D. Ct. Mar. 16, 2001) (dismissing 
challenge to sale), affirmed, 237 Hanrei chiho jiji 96 (Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 28, 2002).  Genpatsu (2003) 
(Japan Communist Party newspaper); Tohoku (n.d.). 
15 In addition to the issues cited, opponents can embroil power companies in litigation over a wide 
range of other questions as well. They sue to block utilities from doing what they need to complete their 
license application: Iwo jima gyogyo kyodo kumiai v. Chugoku denryoku, K.K., 916 Hanrei taimuzu 237 
(Yamaguchi D. Ct. Oct. 11, 1995) (land survey).  They sue to block sympathetic governments from helping 
the utilities:  Hashi v. Nakanishi, 1429 Hanrei jiho 46 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Mar. 22, 1991) (environmental 
impact statement); [No names given], 45 Gyosei jiken saibanrei shu 1112 (Asahikawa D. Ct. Apr. 26, 
1994), aff'd, 48 Gyosai reishu 393 (Sapporo High Ct. May 5, 1997) (waste disposal study). 
16 Onoda v. Okonogi, 1124 Hanrei jiho 34 (Fukushima D. Ct. July 23, 1984), aff'd, 1345 Hanrei 
jiho 33 (Sendai High Ct. Mar. 20, 1990), affirmed, 1441 Hanrei jiho 50 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 29, 1992).  The 
declaration is bizarre, of course, and not just ex post.  Tokyo Electric had built the plant along a coast that 
regularly brought severe earthquakes and high tsunamis -- exactly as happened in 2011.  See Ramseyer 
(2012). 
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rule. 17  And when Tokyo Electric modified reactor 3 at the Daiichi plant to run on 
plutonium, opponents sued again.18
 But opponents did not sue only over Fukushima; they sued nearly everywhere.  
Take the Shiga reactor complex on the Japan Sea shore.  Anti-nuclear activists first sued 
to enjoin the operation of reactor 1 at the complex.  In 1994, the district court noted the 
earthquake risk, but held the reactor safe anyway.
 
19  They then sued over reactor 2.  The 
district court held in their favor in 2006, but the court on appeal reversed:  the reactor was 
safe.20 Opponents similarly challenged licenses for the Ikata reactor (Ehime prefecture), 
the Tokai-mura reactor (Ibaragi), the Takahama reactor (Fukui), the Tomari-mura reactor 
(Hokkaido), the Kashiwazaki reactor (Niigata), the Monju fast breeder reactor (Fukui), 
and the Onagawa reactor (Miyagi).21  They challenged the license to a nuclear waste 
facility.22  And they challenged the license to an enrichment facility.23
 Opponents did not just contest a reactor's safety.  Sometimes they argued that the 
power company had filed inadequate disclosure statements.
 
24                                                        
17 Hirose v. Nasu, 1591 Hanrei jiho 3 (Tokyo D. Ct. Dec. 19, 1996), affirmed 1686 Hanrei jiho 33 
(Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 25, 1999). 
  Sometimes they claimed 
18 [No name given] v. Tokyo denryoku, K.K., 1775 Hanrei jiho 114 (Fukushima D. Ct. Mar. 23, 
2001) (Fukushima 1). 
19 Kawabe v. Hokuriku denryoku, K.K., 1515 Hanrei jiho 3 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Aug. 25, 1994), 
affirmed, 1656 Hanrei jiho 37 (Nagoya High Ct. Sept. 9, 1998), affirmed (Supreme Ct. Dec. 19, 2000). 
20 [No names given], 1930 Hanrei jiho 25 (Kanazawa D. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006); [No names given], 
2045 Hanrei jiho 3 (Nagoya High Ct. Mar. 18, 2009), reversing (Kanazawa D. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006). 
21 Kawaguchi v. Fukuda, 891 Hanrei jiho 38 (Matsuyama D. Ct. Apr. 25, 1978)(Ikata), affirmed, 
Kawaguchi v. Murata, 1136 Hanrei jiho 3 (Takamatsu High Ct. Dec. 14, 1984), affirmed, Inoue v. 
Watanabe, 1441 Hanrei jiho 37 (Sup Ct. Oct. 29, 1992); [No name given], 1057 Hanrei taimuzu 87 
(Matsuyama D. Ct. Dec. 15, 2000) (Ikata); Aizawa v. Murata, 1164 Hanrei jiho 3 (Mito D. Ct. June 25, 
1985), affirmed in relevant part, 1754 Hanrei jiho 35 (Tokyo High Ct. July 4, 2001) (Tokai-mura); Smith v. 
Kansai denki, K.K., 1480 Hanrei jiho 17 (Osaka D. Ct. Dec. 24, 1993) (Takahama); Shigeno v. Hokkaido 
denryoku, K.K., 1676 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sapporo D. Ct. Feb. 22, 1999) (Tomari-mura); Nagasawa v. 
Kumagaya, 1489 Hanrei jiho 19 (Niigata D. Ct. Mar. 24, 1994), affirmed, 52 Somu geppo 1581 (Tokyo 
High Ct. Nov. 22, 2005) (Kashiwazaki); Isobe v. Takeshita, 1264 Hanrei jiho 31 (Fukui D. Ct. Dec. 25, 
1987), reversed, 1322 Hanrei jiho 33 (Nagoya High Ct. July 19, 1989), modified, Tokioka v. Miyazawa, 
1437 Hanrei jiho 29 (Sup Ct. Sept. 22, 1992) (Monju); [No name given], 1727 Hanrei jiho 33 (Fukui D. Ct. 
Mar. 22, 2000), reversed, 1818 Hanrei jiho 3 (Nagoya High Ct. Jan. 27, 2003), reversed, 1909 Hanrei jiho 8 
(Sup. Ct. May 30, 2005) (Monju); Abe v. Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 1482 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sendai D. Ct. Jan. 
31, 1994), affirmed, 1680 Hanrei jiho 46 (Sendai High Ct. Mar. 31, 1999) (Onagawa). 
These are just the published opinions.  News reports indicate that neighbors have sued in other 
cases as well.  The Oct. 26, 2007, decision of the Shizuoka District Court in the litigation over the 
Hamaoka reactor can be found on the website of the plaintiffs:  www.geocities.jp/ear_tn/.   
22 [No name given], 1278 Hanrei taimuzu 97 (Aomori D. Ct. June 16, 2006). 
23 [No names given], 1102 Hanrei taimuzu 79 (Aomori D. Ct. Mar. 15, 2002), affirmed, Hanrei 
taikei 28131668 (Sendai High Ct. May 9, 2006). 
24 Abe v. Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 1452 Hanrei jiho 3 (Sendai D. Ct. Mar. 12, 1993) (disclosure 
required), affirmed, 1460 Hanrei jiho 38 (Sendai High Ct. May 12, 1993), affirmed, Hanrei taikei 28060382 
(Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2000); Miki v. Kawaguchi, 786 Hanrei jiho 3 (Takamatsu High Ct. July 17, 1975) 
(disclosure required); Aizawa v. Prime Minister, 43 Somu geppo 1522 (Tokyo High Ct. Dec. 25, 1996) 
(disclosure not required). 
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procedural irregularities. 25  As at Fukushima, sometimes opponents bought stock and 
filed derivative suits.26  Sometimes they (as shareholders) attended the annual meetings, 
disrupted the proceedings, and then sued to vacate the meeting on the ground that 
management had paid them insufficient attention.27  At least once, they argued that using 
land for nuclear power violated the "public order and good morals" requirement of the 
Civil Code.28  And twice they claimed that a utility's planned site was held "in common" 




 4.  The mob. -- After Fukushima, reporters started to look more closely at the role 
organized crime played in the nuclear industry.  In 2011, for example, freelance journalist 
Tomohiko Suzuki turned to the Fukushima cleanup.  He applied for a job on the crew, 
and arrived at the site to work (Suzuki, 2011).    There, he found the mob involvement he 
detailed at the start of this article.  He spotted some of the men by the famously 
flamboyant full-body tattoos that he noticed as they changed into and out of their 
protective gear.  They told him that they took the Fukushima job for a simple reason:  
they needed work, and the job paid well. "For women it's sex, and for men it's nuclear 
power," went the apparent aphorism.30  "When a man has to survive doing something, it's 
the nuclear industry," explained one journalist.  "[F]or a woman, it's the sex industry."31
 Other cleanup workers were not themselves members of the mob, but told Suzuki 
they had obtained the job through it.  Usually unemployed, they lived homeless or in a 
seedy section of large city.  They knew their local mob representatives, and the 
representatives knew them.  Those representatives introduced them to Tokyo Electric, 
and collected an under-the-table fee for doing so.   
  
 Recent arrests corroborate Suzuki's account.  In 2012, police arrested a member of 
the Sumiyoshi kai mob for brokering workers to the Fukushima cleanup without a 
                                                        
25 Oba v. Japan, 1741 Hanrei jiho 139 (Hakodate D. Ct. July 13, 2000). 
26 Nakagawa v. Abe, 1652 Hanrei jiho 138 (Nagoya D. Ct. Mar. 19, 1998). 
27 Matsushita v. Kyushu denryoku, K.K., 1392 Hanrei jiho 126 (Fukuoka D. Ct. May 14, 1991); 
Nakagaki v. Chubu denryoku, K.K., 116 Shiryoban shoji homu 188 (Nagoya D. Ct. Sept. 30, 1993); 
Shinohara v. Tohoku denryoku, K.K., 109 Shiryo ban shoji homu 64 (Sendai D. Ct. Mar. 24, 1993); 
Kobayashi v. Hokkaido denryoku, K.K., 109 Shiryo ban shoji homu 56 (Sapporo D. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993). 
28 See Minpo [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, Sec. 90; see Shikoku denryoku, K.K. v. Tamura, 
728 Hanrei jiho 27 (Matsuyama D. Ct. Feb. 2, 1974). 
29 [No names given], 1918 Hanrei jiho 58 (Aomori D. Ct. May 10, 2005); [No name given] v. 
Chugoku denryoku, K.K., 1933 Hanrei jiho 84 (Hiroshima High Ct. Oct. 20, 2005), affirmed, 2007 Hanrei 
jiho 58 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2008).  See generally Commentary, 1269 Hanrei taimuzu 121 (2008).  See also 
Shibano v. Tokyo denryoku, K.K., 1361 Hanrei jiho 3 (Niigata D. Ct. July 18, 1990) (Kashiwazaki reactor; 
in commons litigation, all villagers are necessary parties). 
30 Quoted occasionally on the web.  E.g., http://eulabourlaw.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/2011/05/post-
58bd.html. 
31 Adelstein, Dec. 30, 2011. 
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license.32
 In fact, the mob had brokered workers to construction projects for years.  The 
phenomenon is not and never was limited to Fukushima.  The police arrested a member 
of the Kyushu-based Kudo kai in 2012 for brokering labor to Kansai Electric's Ooi 
nuclear plant.  And when in 2011 the President of Hakushin Construction tried to cut the 
firm's ties to a local Kyushu crime syndicate, mob members shot him dead outside his 
home.
  They arrested a member of the smaller Matsuba kai mob for the same crime in 
October 2014 (e.g., Genpatsu (2014a, 2014b). 
33
 
   
C.  Nuclear Power and Social Capital: 
 Wholly aside from the mob, nuclear plants take a toll on communities through 
their effect on young families.  Traditionally, residents did not fear the reactors primarily 
because of the risk of Fukushima-style meltdowns.  They feared them because the 
diseases (mostly cancers) that they worried the reactors would cause.34
 These radiation risks presented apparent costs that correlated inversely with age:  
necessarily, they fell hardest on the young.  Residents did not think that low-level 
radiation would cause cancer in a year; they worried that it might cause cancer after 
several decades.  This presented a potentially enormous cost to a thirty-year-old couple 
nursing a small infant; it suggested a much smaller cost to an elderly couple with only a 
decade or two left to live anyway.  In exchange for accepting a reactor, METI promised 
lavish subsidies and tax revenues.  The young couple was relatively less likely to think 
the cash could offset the cancer risk to them or their child; the elderly couple was 
relatively more likely to take the risk for the money. 
  
 Crucially, when young families leave a community, they cause the level of social 
capital to plummet.  In any society, it is the families with young children who invest most 
heavily in the social ties that hold the community together.  Older couples may bring 
attitudes that value community, but as they age they withdraw and live increasing isolated 
lives.  Older couples do not volunteer for the PTA.  They do not coach middle-school 
baseball teams, help at the local library, or upbraid incipient delinquents on the street.  
Young parents do.  They -- not the retired couples -- contribute in the countless other 
ways that help a community cohere.  It is the "families with children," writes political 
scientist Charles Murray, who stand at "the core" of well-functioning communities 
(Murray, 2012, 165).     
 Several consequences follow.  Once a local utility announces plans for a reactor, 
new young families will not move to the area.  Existing families will leave.  As the most 
stable and committed young couples disappear, the divorce rate will climb.  As 
employers begin to identify the community as fragile, they will locate their plants and 
offices elsewhere.  Unemployment will climb, and -- ever so steadily -- the community 
will begin to disintegrate. 
                                                         
32  See Adelstein, Jan. 24, 2013; Adelstein, May 24, 2012; Adelstein, May 22, 2012; Adelstein, 
Dec. 30, 2011. 
33 Adelstein, May 22, 2012; see Suzuki (2011: 31); Adelstein, supra, May 24, 2012; Adelstein, 
supra, May 24, 2012; Adelstein, supra, Dec. 30, 2011.   
34 It could not have helped that the reactors attracted mob members as well. 
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III.  The Empirical Inquiry 
A.  Introduction: 
 1.  The project. -- The two propositions above suggest the following testable 
hypotheses:   
 (1) Once a utility announces plans for a new reactor, the level of extortion 
should rise.  The number of mob members will increase.  They will come to extort 
money from the utility, but stay to extort funds from other firms too.   
 (2) Once the firm obtains its license and starts construction, extortion will 
fall.   
 For most communities, accepting a nuclear plant is something of a Faustian 
bargain.  The plant will not just invite extortion.  Because it imposes the largest perceived 
costs on young families, it will threaten social capital more generally.   
 (3) To be sure, government transfer payments will increase as promised.   
 (4) But because new parents worry most about radiation, the community 
will lose young families.   
 (5) Because the most stable and committed young couples will disappear, 
the level of social capital will fall and divorce rates will climb.   
 (6) And as social capital falls, employers will stay away and 
unemployment will rise. 
 To test these hypotheses, I take for my dependent measure several indices of 
crime and social capital.  As my principal independent measures, I use dichotomous 
variables equal to 1 if either that municipality or an adjacent municipality is (a) planning, 
(b) building, or (c) operating a nuclear plant.  I use a fixed-effect regression (the 
Hausman test indicates that a random-effects model would be inappropriate), and employ 
a municipality-level data set spanning three decades.  Because the municipality-level data 
do not disaggregate the data by type of crime, I also use a prefecture-level panel dataset 
as appropriate. 
 
 2.  Preliminary qualifications. -- Note several qualifications at the outset.  First, 
the logic behind hypotheses (1) and (2) does not apply only to nuclear plants.  Instead, it 
covers many large-scale projects.  Airports, dams, and new SDF bases can raise the same 
dilemmas.  As the mob member noted at the start of the article:  
 There's nothing special involved.  A huge public project comes to a tiny 
town.  That's really all there is to it.  Dams and highways are exactly the same.   
 I nonetheless focus on nuclear plants both because of the scale involved and 
because of the distinctive effect they have on social capital (on hypotheses (3) through 
(6)).  Nuclear plants involve massive outlays -- and generate correspondingly large quasi-
rents for the utility.  They carry spectacular risks -- and generate correspondingly fervent 
opposition.  Although similar in many ways to dams, highways, airports, and self-defense 
force (SDF) bases, they differ in scale.  What is more, reactors destroy social capital in a 
way that dams, highways, and SDF bases do not.  Nuclear reactors drive young families 
away from the community -- with the consequences for social capital explored below.  
Dams, highways, and SDF bases do not.  
 Second, the decision to build a nuclear plant in a community is endogenous.  
Utilities do not site reactors randomly.  They want them along the coast for access to 
water.  Communities do not accept them randomly either.  For all the reasons noted 
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above, the communities that agree to take them are those with a high fraction of elderly 
residents.  I discuss this issue more fully in Sec. III.C.3, below. 
 Third, I do not count extortion claims only against the utility.  Instead, I count all 
extortion claims reported to the police.  Note the dynamic:  once a utility announces its 
plans for a reactor, it becomes extraordinarily vulnerable to extortion; the mob moves in 
to exploit that vulnerability; and once local, the mob does what it does everywhere -- 
extort money from local businesses.  In other words, the spike in the extortion rate that 
one observes when a utility announces its plans does not only (or even mostly) represent 
extortion against the utility.  Rather, it reflects the mob's arrival in the community.   
 Last -- and most obviously -- because I take my count of extortion cases from the 
police, they represent extortion attempts that failed.  If a local business quietly pays the 
mob, it will seldom report it to the police.  The police will learn of extortion attempts 
only when the business reports it to the police, or when the mob retaliates publicly 
against a recalcitrant firm. 
 
B.  Variables: 
 1.  Panel construction. -- I run fixed effect regressions on prefecture-level and 
municipality-level panel datasets.  The  data cover all 47 prefectures in Japan, and all 
1,742 cities, towns, and villages.  Because Japan has no unincorporated areas, the two 
datasets cover the entire country.  I include all 31 years from 1980 to 2010. 
 
 2.  Nuclear plants. -- I measure the effect of nuclear plants through three key 
independent variables.  They indicate whether the power company has announced its 
plans for a nuclear plant, whether it has begun construction, and whether it has started to 
operate the reactor.  If a municipality has an operating reactor and announces plans for an 
additional one, I ignore the new reactor and simply code the municipality as having an 
operating plant.  Because the risks to a reactor cross city lines, I code a municipality has 
having a reactor if a reactor is present either in the municipality itself or in an adjacent 
municipality.  I take the information from Genshiryoku (2013: 14-17) (see Table 3 for 
detail). 
 
 Plan announced:  1 if a power company has announced plans to build a 
nuclear plant in the municipality or any adjacent municipality (or prefecture). 
 
 Construction begun:  1 if a power company has begun construction of a 
nuclear plant in the municipality or any adjacent municipality (or prefecture). 
 
 Operational:  1 if a power company has begun operating a nuclear plant 
in the municipality or any adjacent municipality (or prefecture). 
 
 For the prefecture-level regressions of Table 5, I ask whether the reactor is in that 
specific prefecture (not an adjacent prefecture). 
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 3.  Other variables. -- I take the other municipality-year panel variables from 
several government sources.35
 [Insert Table 4 about here.] 
  For each variable, I calculate the per capita measure by 
the population statistics given in Somusho, Kokusei (various years), and give the value 
per 1000 population (see Table 4). 
 
 Under 15 PC:  The number of people under age 15, per capita.  Data from 
the Somusho, Kokusei (various years). 
 
 Over 64 PC:  The number of people over age 64, per capita.  Data from 
Somusho, Kokusei (various years). 
 
 Births PC:  The number of births, per capita.  Data from Kosei, Jinko 
(various years). 
 
 Deaths PC:  The number of deaths, per capita.  Data from Kosei, Jinko 
(various years). 
 
 In-migration PC:  The number of in-migrants, per capita.  Data from 
Somusho, Jumin (various years). 
 
 Marriages PC:  The number of marriages, per capita.  Data from Kosei, 
Jinko (various years). 
 
 Divorce rate:  The number of divorces, divided by the number of 
marriages.  Note:  this number is not per 1000 marriages.   Data from Kosei, Jinko 
(various years).  I measure the divorce rate as divorces/marriages rather than 
divorces/population simply to follow scholarly custom in the field. 
 
 Revenue PC:  Municipal revenues (sainyu kessan sogaku), per capita.  
Data from Somusho, Shichoson (various years). 
 
 Unemployment rate:  Number of unemployed workers, divided by the 
15-65 year-old population.  The calculation applies only to workers over age 15, 
and excludes those who deliberately opt out of the organized labor market.  Data 
from Somusho, Kokusei (various years). 
 
 Crimes PC:  The number of non-traffic-related Criminal Code violations 
(keiho han ninchi kensu), per capita.  Data from Keisatsu cho (various years).  
These are overwhelmingly thefts, as explained in Sec. III.C.2(c), below. 
 
                                                        
35   The data can be downloaded from the standard government website http://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/ToukeiDataSelectDispatchAction.do. 
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 3.  Prefecture-level variables. -- Because the municipal-level data do not 
distinguish among crimes, in Table 5 I run the regressions on prefecture-level data.  I use 
the following variable: 
 
 Extortion PC:  The number of "sobo" crimes, per capita:  extortion, 
blackmail, assembly with a dangerous weapon, assault, and battery.  Data from 
Keisatsu cho (various years).   These crimes are heavily associated with the mob. 
 
C.  Regressions: 
 1.  Extortion. -- In Panel A of Table 5, I regress (a) the level of extortion per 
capita over 1980-2010 on (b) several independent variables that reflect reactor siting.  
Because data disaggregated by crime are not available at the municipality level, I use a 
prefecture-level dataset.  In fact, that limitation presents less of a problem than one might 
think.  Mobs will not usually extort funds from a power company in the coastal village 
where it actually builds the reactor.  They will approach it instead at its local 
headquarters.   
 In Regression (1), I use prefecture fixed effects.  In Regression (2), I add year 
fixed effects as well.  The qualitative results do not differ. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
 When a utility announces plans to build a reactor, the mob arrives and tries to 
extort funds from it.  While present in the community, it extorts funds from other local 
businesses as well.  According to Table 5 Panel A, the coefficient on the announcement 
of a plan is positive and statistically significant in both regressions.36
 Panel B gives the actual level of extortion involved.  During the years before the 
utility announces its plans for a new reactor, these towns had mean per capita (crimes per 
1000 population) extortion rates of .277.  Once the company announced its plans, that 
rate rose to .440.  It fell to .318 during construction, and stayed at .329 once operation 
commenced. 
  When the firm 
obtains its license and starts construction, the number of extortion cases falls.  Given that 
the utility has obtained the permits necessary to build the plant, it is now less vulnerable 
to the mob.  Given that the mob often brokers unskilled labor to construction projects (as 
Suzuki's (2011) account at the start of the article reflects), however, it may be earning a 
cut of the utility's labor bill.  By one account, mob firms generally take a 3 percent cut on 
public-sector construction projects (Kingston, 2013: 245). 
 Once a utility begins to operate the reactor, Regression (2) suggests that extortion 
rates fall below their initial level.  Note, however, that this phenomenon appears only 
with the inclusion of year fixed effects.  It does not appear in Regression (1).  Neither 
does it appear in the period averages in Panel B.  According to those figures, extortion 
rates after a reactor begins operation remain higher than before the utility initially 
announced its plans to built it. 
 
 2.  Social capital. -- (a) Demographics. Nuclear plants change a community, and 
in problematic ways.  As explained in Sec. II.C., perceived radiation risks fall most                                                         
36 The results are insignificant in the regressions with year fixed effects if I extend the period back 
to 1975.  Note that significant coefficients do not appear on the (generally mob-related) crimes involving 
stimulants or the sex industry. 
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heavily on the young.  Other than the catastrophic meltdown, the perceived harm (largely, 
a cancer risk) accrues over decades.  For couples with young children, the risks can seem 
huge.  For couples already retired (and, to put it crassly, a decade or two from death 
anyway), they will be more modest.  Should a community accept a reactor, older couples 
may not much care.  Younger parents will find it a less attractive place to raise their 
family (an instinct probably aggravated by the arrival of the mob).   
 Table 6 reflects this dynamic.  Once a power company announces plans to build a 
reactor, young families disappear.  The fraction of children under age 15 per capita falls 
while the fraction of people over 64 rises (Table 6).  The fraction of births falls while the 
fraction of deaths rises.  The coefficients on the age variables are significant and robust to 
the inclusion of year fixed effects (Table 6 Pan. B).  The coefficients on the number of 
births become insignificant with the year fixed effects, but the coefficients on the number 
of deaths per capita remain robust.  The rate at which people move into the community 
may also fall when a community builds a reactor (Pan. A), though the results disappear 
with the introduction of year fixed effects (Pan. B).  
 [Insert Table 6 about here.] 
 
 (b) Divorce, government revenue, and unemployment.  The reactor's effects on 
local social capital go farther.  Families with young children maintain the most extensive 
ties within the community.  As they disappear, social cohesion declines.  According to 
Table 7, marriage rates fall and divorce rates rise.  The decline in marriage rates appears 
strongly in Panel A, but disappears with the inclusion of year fixed effects in Panel B.  
The increase in divorce rates, however, is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects.  In 
Panel A, the positive coefficients are significantly positive for all three periods.  In Panel 
B, they are significantly positive during the plan announcement period, and nearly 
significant during the construction period as well.   
 [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
 As promised, the reactor brings the local government enormous revenue.  The 
coefficients on government revenue are large and significant in Panel A.  In the Panel B 
regression with year fixed-effects, they are nearly significant during the plan 
announcement period, and become massive once construction begins.  The revenues 
remain high after the reactor turns operational. 
 And as a community accepts a reactor, unemployment rates rise.  In the Panel A 
regression of unemployment rates on reactor variables, the coefficients are positive and 
significant in all periods.  In Panel B, the inclusion of year fixed-effects limits the 
significantly positive coefficients to the first period.  As the young families disappear and 
social capital falls, employers apparently disappear too -- and unemployment levels rise.  
During construction, the utility hires large numbers of young men, and this may explain 
the insignificant coefficient on the period in Panel B.  Unemployed workers will leave in 
search of jobs elsewhere, and this in turn may explain the insignificant coefficient on the 
operational period in Panel B.   
 
 (c) The crime rate puzzle.  When a community begins operating a reactor, general 
crime rates fall.  Although crime rates climb in the Panel A regressions without year fixed 
effects, they fall with the inclusion of those effects in Panel B.  This rate, however, does 
not reflect mob crimes.  Instead, it primarily captures thefts.  In 1980, 1.17 million of the 
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1.36 million crimes in Japan (i.e., Criminal Code violations) were thefts.  In 2010, 1.57 
million of the 1.78 million crimes were thefts.  In effect, the regressions of Crimes PC in 
Table 7 mostly represent regressions of the number of thefts per capita.  
 Thefts are not a mob crime.  In a typical year, less than two percent of the people 
police arrest for theft are members of a mob.  Instead, the theft rate in a community 
reflects the fraction of young people more generally.  As the reactors drive young 
families away, the fraction of adolescent boys in the community falls (see Table 6, Reg 
(1)), and the rate of theft declines.   
 
 3. Endogeneity. -- Power companies do not select the sites for their nuclear 
reactors randomly (see generally Aldrich, 2008, 2012; Dusinberre & Aldrich, 2011).  
Neither do communities accept the reactors randomly.  The power companies need access 
to water to cool the reactors.  In France, they build their reactors along the Rhine.  In 
Japan, they build them by the sea.   
 In deciding whether to accept a proposed reactor, communities face a trade-off.  
On the one hand, if they choose to let the utility build the reactor, they receive the 
enormous infusion of cash:  initial subsidies and continuing property tax revenues.  With 
that cash, they can buy facilities and services they could not otherwise afford.  On the 
other, communities incur the perceived risk of radiation (and the accompanying hit to 
social capital captured in Tables 6 and 7).  As discussed (Sec. II.C.), the costs to these 
risks fall with age.  Disproportionately, they fall hardest on the young.   
 Predictably, the communities that choose to take the subsidies at the cost of the 
radiation risk are old.  At the time of the siting announcement, they are also communities 
with lower crime and divorce rates -- but those characteristics simply reflect resident age.  
In Table 8, I use probit regressions to explore which communities decide to accept a 
nuclear reactor.  In each case, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the municipality 
accepted a reactor over the course of 1980-2010.  The independent variables represent 
community values as of 1980.  The only consistently significant result appears on the 
fraction of the population that dies in any year -- a proxy for fraction that is elderly.  The 
older the community, the more likely it will opt to accept a reactor. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here.] 
 This result is also consistent with Aldrich's (2008, 2012) hypothesis that utilities 
site reactors in the communities lease able to organize.  Because people withdraw as they 
age, elderly couples have fewer ties within the community than younger couples.  Aldrich 
(2008, 2012) argues that they find it harder to organize against a planned reactor, and the 
results in Table 8 are consistent with this hypothesis. 
   
IV.  Conclusions 
 Nuclear reactors entail massive non-transferrable site-specific investments.  In 
turn, the resulting appropriable quasi-rents offer the mob the ideal target.  It can promise 
to "protect" the utility, and take money for silencing the reactor's local opponents.  
Alternatively, it can "extort"  from the utility, and take money for not inciting local 
opponents.  Prefecture-level panel data from 1980 to 2010 confirm this phenomenon.  
When a utility announces plans to build a reactor, the mob moves in, and the level of 
extortion per capita climbs.   
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 The reactor has more broad-ranging, debilitating effects on social capital as well -
- as the municipality-level data show.  The costs imposed by a local reactor correlate 
inversely with age.  As a result, when a utility announces plans for a reactor, young 
families disappear.  Death rates rise, birth rates fall, and the fraction of elderly residents 
climbs.  Reliance on government subsidies increases, divorce rates climb, and 
unemployment rises.   
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A.  Largest Criminal Organizations 
 
           Formal 
    Headquarters      Membership 
 Yamaguchi gumi  Kobe     11,600  
 Sumiyoshi kai   Tokyo     4,200 
 Inagawa kai   Tokyo     3,300 
 Matsuba kai   Tokyo       910 
 Kyokuto kai   Tokyo        880  
 Dojin kai   Kurume, Fukuoka     630 
 Kudo kai    Kita-kyushu, Fukuoka     560 
 
 Total formal (registered) membership  25,600 
 
 Source:  Keisatsu cho, Heisei 26 nen johanki no 
boryokudan josei [The Situation of Organized Crime in the 
First Half of 2014] (Tokyo:  Keisatsu cho, 2014), p. 21. 
 
 
B.  Most Common Arrests of Organized Crime Members 
 
  Stimulants    6,045 
  Battery     2,807 
  Theft     2,470 
  Fraud     2,321 
  Extortion     1,084 
 
  Total arrests   22,861 
 
 
 Source:  Keisatsu cho, Heisei 26 nen johanki no 
boryokudan josei [The Situation of Organized Crime in the 
First Half of 2014] (Tokyo:  Keisatsu cho, 2014), pp. 3, 6. 
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A.  Crimes with Largest Fraction of Arrests Involving Mob  
 
    Mob Arrests Total Arrests %    . 
Horse racing  14   14    100 
Bicycle racing  34   35    97.1 
Gambling   511   876    58.3 
Stimulants  6285   11379   55.2 
False imprisonment 201   424    47.4 
Blackmail   1334   3050   43.7 
Opiates   543   1576   34.5 
Extortion   617   2145   28.8 
 
 Source:  Homu sho, Hanzai hakusho [Crime White Paper] 
(Tokyo:  Homu sho, 2013), Tab. 4-2-2-2. 
 
 
B.  Selected Crimes and the Location of the Mob 
 
 
        Dependent variable:   
    Extortion Stimulant Sex  Theft  
      Crimes Crimes  . 
 
Mob membership  .119*** .059** .037*** 1.151  
    (3.11) (2.47) (2.97) (1.18) 
Population  5.26*** 1.40*** .752*** 110.0*** 
    (14.96) (6.33) (6.49) (12.30)   
 
Adj. R2   .96  .86  .88  .94  
 
 Notes:  Coefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of the t-statistic in parentheses.  The regressions are 
OLS.  Data are at the prefectural level, with n = 47.  
Crime data are from 2010; mob membership is as of 2011.  
Extortion is "sobo" crimes, as discussed in the text.  
Total crimes are as defined in the text.  Population is 
/10,000. 
 
 Sources:  Crime data are from Keisatsu sho (2011), 
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Reactor     Plans  Construction    Operation 
        Announced     Began    Commenced 
Tokai, Ibaraki 1959 1961 1966a  
Tsuruga 1, Fukui 1965 1967 1970 
Mihama 1, Fukui 1966 1967 1970 
Fukushima Daiichi 1, Fuk'ma 1966 1967 1971 
Fukushima Daiichi 2, Fuk'ma 1968 1969 1974 
Mihama 2, Fukui 1968 1968 1972 
Takahama 1, Fukui 1969 1970 1974 
Fukushima Daiichi 3, Fuk'ma 1969 1970 1976 
Hamaoka 1, Shizuoka 1969 1971 1976 
Shimane 1, Shimane 1969 1970 1974 
Oi 1, Fukui 1970 1972 1979 
Oi 2, Fukui 1970 1972 1979 
Unkai 1, Saga 1970 1971 1975 
Takahama 2, Fukui 1970 1971 1975 
Onagawa 1, Miyagi 1970 1971 1984 
Mihama 3, Fukui 1971 1972 1976 
Fukushima Daiichi 5, Fuk'ma 1971 1971 1978 
Fukushima Daiichi 4, Fuk'ma 1971 1972 1978 
Hamaoka 2, Shizuoka 1972 1973 1978b  
Ikata 1, Ehime 1972 1973 1977 
Fukushima Daiichi 6, Fuk'ma 1972 1973 1979 
Fukushima Daini 1, Fukushima 1972 1975 1982 
Tokai 2, Ibaragi 1972 1973 1978 
Unkai 2, Saga 1974 1976 1981 
Kashiwazaki 1, Niigata 1974 1978 1985 
Fukushima Daini 2, Fukushima 1975 1979 1984 
Ikata 2, Ehime 1975 1977 1982 
Kawauchi 1, Kagoshima 1976 1978 1984 
Fukushima Daini 3, Fukushima 1977 1980 1985 
Kawauchi 2, Kagoshima 1978 1981 1985 
Takahama 3, Fukui 1978 1980 1985 
Takahama 4, Fukui 1978 1980 1985 
Fukushima Daini 4, Fukushima 1978 1980 1987 
Hamaoka 3, Shizuoka 1978 1982 1987 
Tsuruga 2, Fukui 1979 1982 1987 
Kashiwazaki 2, Niigata 1981 1983 1990 
Kashiwazaki 5, Niigata 1981 1983 1990 
Shimane 2, Shimane 1981 1984 1989 
 
(Continued on next page.) 
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Reactor     Plans  Construction    Operation 
        Announced     Begins   Commences 
Unkai 3, Saga 1982 1985 1994 
Unkai 4, Saga 1982 1985 1997 
Oki 1, Hokkaido 1982 1984 1989 
Oki 2, Hokkaido 1982 1984 1991 
Monju, Fukui 1983 1985 1994 
Ikata 3, Ehime 1983 1986 1994 
Kashiwazaki 3, Niigata 1985 1987 1993 
Kashiwazaki 4, Niigata 1985 1987 1994 
Oi 3, Fukui 1985 1987 1991 
Oi 4, Fukui 1985 1987 1993 
Hamaoka 4, Shizuoka 1986 1988 1993 
Shiga 1, Ishikawa 1987 1988 1993 
Onagawa 2, Miyagi 1987 1989 1995 
Kashiwazaki 6, Niigata 1988 1991 1996 
Kashiwazaki 7, Niigata 1988 1991 1997 
Onagawa 3, Miyagi 1994 1996 2002 
Totsu 1, Aomori 1996 1998 2005 
Hamaoka 5, Shizuoka 1997 1999 2005 
Shiga 2, Ishikawa 1997 1999 2006 
Oma, Aomori 1999 2008 
Oki 3, Hokkaido 2000 2003 2009 
Shimane 3, Shimane 2000 2005 
Kamiseki 1, Yamaguchi 2001 
Kamiseki 2, Yamaguchi 2001 
Tsuruga 3, Fukui 2002 
Tsuruga 4, Fukui 2002 
Totsu 1, Aomori 2006 2011 
Totsu 2, Aomori 2006 
 
 
 a.  Decommissioned 2001. 





 Source:  Genshiryoku anzen kiban kiko, ed., 
Genshiryoku shisetsu unten kanri nempo [Supervision of 
Nuclear Facilities Operation Annual] (Tokyo:  Genshiryoku 
anzen kiban kiko, 2013).   
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 n Min  Mean Median Max  . 
Extortion PC*  1,457 .103 .356 .321 1.03 
Under 15 PC 54,001 42.5 171 166 353  
Over 64 PC 54,001 36.8 190 179 572 
Births PC 54,001 0 9.37 9.20 39.0 
Deaths PC 54,001 0 9.10 8.69 69.7 
InMigration PC 26,129 2.05 38.7 35.3 322 
Marriage PC 54,001 0 5.11 5.04 30.8 
Divorce rate 53,916 0 .289 .266 4.00 
Unemployment PC 54,001 0 40.2 35.6 294 
Crimes PC 48,592 0 9.85 8.60 122 




 Notes:  * Prefecture-level.  All values other than 
those for the divorce rate are per 1000 population. 
 
 Sources:  See text. 
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A.  Regressions: 
 
Dependent variable:     Extortion PC . 
  (1)  (2) 
Plan announced .148*** .052** 
 (3.92) (2.00) 
Const'n begun .049 -.014 
 (1.38) (0.56) 
Operational .019 -.053** 
 (0.59) (2.29) 
 
n 1457 1457 
F test 24.27 51.49 




B.  Extortion PC: 
 
 Mean Extortion PC for pre-planning period: .277 
 Mean Extortion PC during planning:   .440 
 Mean Extortion PC during construction:  .318 




 Notes:  *, **, ***:  significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels.  Prefecture-level fixed effect regressions, 
with coefficient, followed by absolute value of the t-
statistic.  F test that all Ui = 0.  The independent 
variables are equal to 1 if that prefecture has a reactor.  
Years 1980-2010. 
 
 Sources:  See text. 
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Table 6:  The Effects of Nuclear Power on Demographics 
 
 
A.  Without Year-Fixed Effects: 
 
Dependent variable: Under  Over Births Deaths InMig 
 15 PC 64 PC PC PC PC     . 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Plan announced -50.0*** 80.1*** -1.94*** 2.84*** -6.38*** 
 (10.83) (10.94) (6.95) (11.04) (4.13) 
Const'n begun -45.5*** 55.0*** -1.34*** 1.89*** -6.79*** 
 (11.34) (8.65) (5.55) (8.46) (3.09) 
Operational -92.3*** 140.2*** -4.26*** 3.72*** -14.9*** 
 (23.82) (22.86) (18.25) (17.20) (5.82) 
 
n 54,001 54,001 54,001 54,001 26,129 
F test 11.35 30.51 19.98 54.89 82.06 
 
 
B.  With Year Fixed Effects: 
 
Dependent variable: Under  Over Births Deaths InMig 
 15 PC 64 PC PC PC PC     . 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Plan announced -.9.78*** 14.6*** -.038 1.27*** -1.22 
 (6.97) (6.20) (0.23) (7.03) (0.93) 
Const'n begun -19.2*** 11.7*** -.082 .767*** 2.26 
 (15.81) (5.75) (0.58) (4.90) (1.22) 
Operational -12.4*** 20.7*** -.047 .810*** -.777 
 (10.52) (10.43) (0.34) (5.32) (0.36) 
 
n 54,001 54,001 54,001 54,001 26,129 






 Notes:  *, **, ***:  significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels.  Coefficient, followed by absolute value of 
the t-statistic.  F test that all Ui = 0.  The independent 
variables are equal to 1 if that or an adjacent 
municipality has a reactor.  Years 1980-2010. 
 
 Sources:  See text. 
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A.  Without Year Fixed Effects: 
 
Dependent variable: Marriage Divorce Revenues Unempl Crimes 
 PC rate PC@ PC   PC    . 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Plan announced -.403*** .174*** 148*** 19.2*** 1.423*** 
 (3.27) (8.80) (5.36) (11.34) (2.57) 
Const'n begun -.226*** .099*** 199*** 9.17*** -.289 
 (2.11) (5.76) (8.29) (6.24) (0.59) 
Operational -.950*** .186*** 464*** 23.4*** 1.127** 
 (9.19) (11.27) (20.03) (16.49) (2.38) 
 
n 54,001 53,916 54,001 54,001 48,592 
F test 37.38 5.73 108.11 21.41 49.54 
 
 
B.  With Year Fixed Effects: 
 
Dependent variable: Marriage Divorce Revenues Unempl Crimes 
 PC rate PC@ PC     PC   . 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Plan announced -.032 .051*** 34.6 4.895*** -.648 
 (0.29) (3.22) (1.60) (6.72) (1.45) 
Const'n begun .041 .022 121.3*** -.041 -1.269*** 
 (0.43) (1.62) (6.49) (0.06) (3.17) 
Operational -.042 -.008 176.7*** -.444 -1.860*** 
 (0.45) (0.61) (9.75) (0.73) (4.84) 
 
n 54,001 53,916 54,001 54,001 48,592 




 Notes:  *, **, ***:  significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels.  Coefficient, followed by absolute value of 
the t-statistic.  F test that all Ui = 0.  The independent 
variables are equal to one if that or an adjacent 
municipality has a reactor.  @ These coefficients are per 
capita rather than per 1000 capita.  Years 1980-2010. 
 
 Sources:  See text. 
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Dependent variable:  Reactor sited 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) . 
Unempl PC 11.89  -21.52 -21.22 -21.43 
 (1.13)  (0.78) (0.75) (0.75) 
Crimes PC  -175.4* -75.61 -71.32 -75.43 
  (1.76) (0.65) (0.56) (0.59) 
Births PC   -31.69 -44.84 -45.45 
   (0.37) (0.41) (0.41) 
Deaths PC   224.1** 219.7** 221.2** 
   (2.43) (2.37) (2.37) 
Marriage PC    2.494 2.601 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Divorce rate    -.919 -.922 
    (0.27) (0.27) 
Population     8.13e-07 
     (0.41) 
 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.12 0.37 0.38 0.37 




 Notes:  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
municipality without a reactor announced plans for a 
reactor during 1980-2010.  Regressions are probit, 
variables are 1980 values, and coefficients are per capita 
rather than per 1000 capita. 
 *, **, ***:  significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels.  Coefficient, followed by absolute value of the t-
statistic.  F test that all Ui = 0.   
 
 Sources:  See text. 
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